Domestic abuse complainant succeeds in High Court appeal as ‘parental alienation’ findings are overturned following representation by Proudmans

Rhianna’s (not her real name) case is a powerful example of how urgent, specialist legal intervention can make a decisive difference in children proceedings where a parent believes that a final order exposes them and their child to serious harm.

Rhianna contacted Proudmans shortly before Christmas, following a final order made by His Honour Judge Ahmed in the Family Court. Under that order, her young son was due to spend three weekends in every four with his father during term time. Those arrangements were due to come into force in early January 2026. Rhianna was deeply concerned that the order would cause immense harm to both her and her son.

She approached us under our unbundled fixed-fee arrangement. This meant that she could instruct us for clearly defined pieces of work, with transparent costs, without needing to commit to full representation throughout the entire proceedings.

Before Christmas, Rhianna had an initial conference with our Director and Solicitor, Ms Manveet Chhina. Ms Chhina urgently reviewed the documents from the lower court proceedings, considered the order under appeal, and drafted the grounds of appeal, the Appellant’s Notice and a full written submission seeking an urgent stay of execution.

On 6 January 2026, Ms Justice Harris granted a stay on the papers. This was a critical step. It meant that the child arrangements order made by HHJ Ahmed would not come into force.

Ms Chhina then drafted a detailed skeleton argument in support of the appeal. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds on the papers.

The appeal hearing took place on 8 June 2026. Rhianna was robustly represented at the hearing by Dr Charlotte Proudman, again through our unbundled fixed-fee service. Following Dr Proudman’s submissions on behalf of the Appellant Mother, Ms Justice Harris allowed the appeal on all grounds, set aside the final order, and remitted the case for urgent reconsideration by the Family Court.

What Rhianna said after the hearing

Following the appeal, Rhianna said of Ms Manveet Chhina:

“I want to say thank you for all the work you put into my appeal. Your attention to detail, precise knowledge of the law, and insightful reasoning gained permission on all grounds, changing the trajectory of proceedings for my son. I especially appreciated that you completed the initial work over Christmas. Without that, I would have had the additional barrier of a late application to overcome.”

Of Dr Charlotte Proudman, Rhianna said:

“Thank you again for your excellent representation yesterday. Despite it being such an important and daunting hearing, it was the most relaxed I’ve felt in court. It was absolutely the right outcome and I’m so thankful and relieved.”

The grounds of appeal

The appeal challenged the lower court’s approach on seven grounds.

The first ground was that the judge had erred in law and acted in a procedurally unfair manner by making adverse findings against the mother amounting to alienating behaviour, including findings that there was a probability that the mother had influenced the child.

The second ground was that the judge had wrongly treated alleged alienating behaviour as a live issue in isolation, while failing properly to treat domestic abuse as a live and determinative issue. This was contrary to the Family Justice Council Guidance on Responding to Allegations of Alienating Behaviours.

The third ground was that the judge had failed to apply the protections required under the Family Procedure Rules and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 by failing to ensure that appropriate special measures were in place when the mother gave evidence. In particular, the mother gave evidence by CVP [remote hearing link] while both parties had their cameras switched on, in circumstances where the father was able to watch her.

The fourth ground was that the judge had departed from the recommendations of the Cafcass officer without giving clear and properly reasoned justification, despite acknowledging that cogent reasons were required.

The fifth ground concerned the treatment of the mother’s Independent Domestic Violence Adviser. The appeal argued that the judge was wrong to exclude or dismiss the IDVA’s evidence on the basis that her qualifications were unknown, that her evidence was hearsay, and that her views were no more than personal opinion.

The sixth ground challenged the imposition of a two-year barring order against both parties, on the basis that it was unjustified as a matter of law and fact.

The seventh ground was that the welfare analysis was flawed. The lower court had ordered the father to spend three weekends in every four with the child during term time, a regime materially more extensive than that recommended by Cafcass and unsupported by a proper welfare analysis.

Why the appeal succeeded

Ms Justice Harris allowed the appeal on all grounds.

In her brief ex-tempore reasons, with full written reasons to follow, the judge made clear that the appeal court’s role was not to decide the substantive child arrangements dispute afresh. The question was whether the lower court had fallen into errors such that the decision was wrong. Ms Justice Harris was satisfied that it had.

The court held that the finding of alienation against the mother could not stand. The mother had not been put on proper notice that such a finding would be sought against her, and the matter had not been properly put to her in cross-examination. More fundamentally, the lower court’s approach to alienating behaviour was not in line with the Family Justice Council guidance or appellate authority.

The court emphasised that allegations of alienating behaviour cannot properly be considered in isolation from allegations of domestic abuse. Where there are competing allegations, the court must consider whether the domestic abuse allegations are made out on the evidence and, if they are, whether they provide an explanation for a child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with the other parent.

Ms Justice Harris found that the lower court had failed to consider whether the mother’s domestic abuse allegations provided a context for the child’s wishes and feelings, and for the observations made by the IDVA and the child’s school. That flawed approach undermined the welfare reasoning which had led to the increase in the father’s time with the child.

The court also found that the welfare analysis had begun from a false legal premise. The lower court appeared to have approached the case from a starting point of equal shared care. Ms Justice Harris made clear that this plays no part in English law. The applicable legal principle is the child’s welfare, considered through the welfare checklist.

The appeal also succeeded because the lower court had failed to ensure that appropriate special measures were in place for the mother when she gave evidence. Where domestic abuse is alleged, the responsibility lies squarely with the court to ensure that vulnerable parties can participate and give their best evidence.

The court further held that insufficient reasons had been given for departing from the Cafcass officer’s recommendations. The Cafcass report was detailed and careful. Although the court is not bound by Cafcass recommendations, clear and cogent reasons were required before departing from them.

The treatment of the IDVA’s evidence was also found to be erroneous. Ms Justice Harris recognised that IDVAs are domestic abuse specialists who can provide informed risk assessments and assistance to the court. While their evidence is not determinative, it should not be wrongly dismissed as irrelevant or merely personal opinion.

The appeal was also allowed in respect of the barring order imposed. The order had followed from the lower court’s substantive welfare findings, and because those findings could not stand, that part of the order could not stand either.

For all of those reasons, the appeal was allowed, the final order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court for urgent reconsideration.

Why unbundled fixed-fee work matters

Not every client can afford full representation throughout long-running family proceedings. Many parents come to us at a point of crisis, often after orders have been made, when urgent action is needed and time is extremely limited. Our unbundled fixed-fee service is designed for those situations. In suitable cases, it allows clients to obtain specialist legal assistance for specific pieces of work.

Protecting children at risk of harm

At Proudmans, we are committed to representing parents and children in cases involving domestic abuse, coercive control, allegations of alienating behaviour, and contested child arrangements.

We understand that allegations of alienation must not be used to obscure or minimise allegations of domestic abuse. We also understand the importance of ensuring that vulnerable parties have proper participation directions and special measures so that they can give their best evidence.

Where a child may be at risk of harm, careful legal analysis and urgent action can be essential. Appeals in family cases are technically demanding and time-sensitive. The grounds must be properly identified, the documents must be prepared with precision, and any application for a stay must be made urgently and persuasively.

This case demonstrates the importance of specialist representation where the welfare of a child and the safety of a parent are at stake.

Need urgent advice about an appeal or child arrangements order?

If you are concerned that a child arrangements order places you or your child at risk of harm, or if you need urgent advice about appealing a decision of the Family Court, Proudmans can provide specialist advice and representation, including through unbundled fixed-fee arrangements where appropriate*.

Every case turns on its own facts. Early advice is essential, particularly where there are short deadlines for appeals or where urgent protective steps may be required.

*Please note that our ability to provide you with an ‘unbundled’ service is dependent on the complexity of your case, and there are cases where we are unable to offer this service, so please do enquire.